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Abstract—Traditional vulnerability scanning methods are time-consuming
and indecisive, and they negatively affect network performance by generating
high network traffic. In this paper, we present a novel vulnerability scanner that
is time-efficient, simple, accurate, and safe. We call it a Calcium Vulnerability
Scanner (CVS). Our contribution to vulnerability scanning are the follow-
ing: (i) minimize its required time and network traffic: compared to current
technologies, we reduced the former by an average of 79% and the latter
by 99.9%, (ii) increase its accuracy: compared to current technologies, we
improved this by an average of 2600%, and (iii) enable the scanner to learn
from previous scans in order to reduce future scanning time and enhance
accuracy: compared to current technologies, CVS reduced scanning time by
an average of 97%. CVS enables a new frontier in vulnerability scanning
and allow for scalable and efficient deployment of such tools in large-scale
networks, containers, edge computing, and cloud computing.
Index Terms—Vulnerability Scanning; Security Assessments; Large-Scale
Scanning; National Vulnerability Database; NVD; CVE
1 Introduction
Information technology (IT) components might suffer from
security vulnerabilities that could allow adversaries to ex-
ploit them for unintended purposes. The number of new
vulnerabilities per year increased by 15 times from 1999 to
2019. Additionally, a myriad of security breaches targeted
virtually all aspects of the current technological landscape:
afflicted individuals (e.g., identify theft), various organiza-
tions (e.g., ransomware that held many hospitals to ransoms
[1]), governments (e.g., the Stuxnet worm that stymied Ira-
nian nuclear facilities [2]), and even nations (e.g., Facebook
Cambridge Analytica files that affected millions of Ameri-
cans). This highlighted the importance of rigorous security
testing to identify and fix vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scan-
ning is an integral component in security assessments and
risk analysis. It plays a pivotal role in safeguarding IT assets
by identifying their security weaknesses, to enable fixing
them before being exploited by adversaries. Due to the
importance of vulnerability scanning, some governmental
and industrial standards consider periodical scans as a com-
pulsory requirement (e.g., PCI-DSS, GDPR); others consider
it as a recommended requirement (e.g., ISO/IEC 27001) [3].
Vulnerability scanners evaluate targets based on a prede-
fined policy. Policies differ in scanning times that range from
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several minutes to several hours per host. For example, an
exhaustive scanning policy, which provides the highest level
of assurance, tries to discover open ports for each connected
device. Subsequently, discovered open ports are tested to
identify running services. Afterwards, the scanner tries to
discover vulnerabilities associated with each service. This
is a protracted process that suffers from numerous issues
such as (1) generating high network traffic that might con-
gest or even disrupt network operations, (2) indecisiveness
because other network devices (e.g., a firewall) might drop
scanning packets without being detected, and (3) different
scanning software providing different results due to lack of
standardized procedures. Moreover, vulnerability scanners
might alter the tested services because the scanner could
send active probes that can change essential components
such as databases. Sending malformed packets during scans
might also contribute to destabilizing or causing a complete
crash of the system [4]. Although vulnerability scanning is
an important tool to assess the security of IT devices, current
solutions fail to provide an easy, fast, reliable, decisive, and
simple method to perform scans.
Vulnerability scanning is an essential service provided
by CERTs/CSIRTs in their proactive assessments landscape.
The aforementioned downsides of vulnerability scanners
limit their effectiveness and scalability. Scanning a single
target requires about 5 minutes to 4 hours1. Additionally, we
found that scanning the same host more than once requires
the same scanning time, as the scanner cannot improve itself
from previous scans of the same host.
This led us to a fundamental research question: is it
possible for a national CERT (or any organization) to provide a
vulnerability scanning service for a country that has 10 million2
hosts? The answer to this question is: no, not with feasible
consideration for time and resources. There are two main
obstacles to achieving this. First, many hosts hide behind
a NAT IP address and do not have an accessible network
interface outside the NAT. Deploying a localized scanner for
each network might resolve this issue. However, this would
lead to management overhead. Second, the time required for
scanning is very long. We have been optimistic in choosing
1. Some references show that it takes from 20 minutes to 4 hours.
However, our experimental results showed that some vulnerability
scanners can finish the job in 5 minutes for TCP scans.
2. Assuming 10 million is the average country’s host population.
2the 5 minutes3 per scan time; others estimated it as 20+ min-
utes per host. However, even with such optimism, scanning
10 million hosts, each requiring ~5 minutes, is a huge task.
Increasing the level of parallelism might resolve this issue,
but it would probably lead to denial of service for the CERT
or hosts because the generated traffic during a scan is very
large. Based on our experimental results, scanning a single
host requires exchanging ~150,000 packets4 (for TCP scans
only).
Contributions
We propose a novel vulnerability scanner called CVS. It
covers all types of vulnerabilities (e.g., network, in-host), it is
fast, scalable, accurate, and learns from previous scans. We
compared CVS scanner to two vulnerability scanners: Ten-
able Nessus and Rapid7 Insight VM (Nexpose). Compared
to Nessus, CVS reduced scanning time by an average of 83%
for the worst-case scenarios and by 99.75% for the best-case
scenarios. Compared to Nexpose, CVS reduced scanning
time by an average of 30% for the worst-case scenarios and
by 98.96% for the best-case scenarios. For both cases, CVS
reduced the network traffic by 99.9% and improved scanning
accuracy by ~2600%. In this context, worst-case scenario
refers to scanning a service for the first time, and best-case
scenario means scanning a service that has been scanned
previously. CVS uses the Common Platform Enumeration
(CPE) to the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE)
matching to perform vulnerability scanning based on au-
tomatically generated CPEs from the properties of IT com-
ponents (e.g., installed program properties in a Windows
operating system). The client source code is available at
https://github.com/SariSultan/CVS-client.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
supplies the background material and discusses the related
work. In Section 3, we present the threat model, assump-
tions, and goals. Section 4 discusses our methodology and
implementation. Section 5 addresses methods and conven-
tions used to generate search components in CVS. Our
experimental results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7
presents the security analysis of CVS. Finally, Section 8
concludes the paper.
2 Background
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
defines a vulnerability as in Definition 1. It also defines vul-
nerability assessment (also known as vulnerability analysis
or vulnerability scanning) as in Definition 2. Vulnerability
scanning does not improve the system’s security unless the
discovered vulnerabilities are fixed according to the organi-
zation’s remediation strategy. For example, a vulnerability
scanner could discover a critical vulnerability in a device
running the Windows 10 operating system. The system
administrator should install the necessary patch to resolve
3. We managed to achieve this number by disabling UDP ports
scanning. Otherwise, it would take much longer to finish scans.
4. With Nessus and Rapid7 Nexpose scanners.
this issue, if applicable, or restrict access to the device. Oth-
erwise, the system remains vulnerable to exploits targeting
that vulnerability.
Definition 1 (Vulnerability). "weakness in an information
system, system security procedures, internal controls, or im-
plementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat
source." [5]
Definition 2 (Vulnerability Assessment). "systematic exami-
nation of an information system or product to determine the
adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies,
provide data from which to predict the effectiveness of proposed
security measures, and confirm the adequacy of such measures
after implementation" [5]
To the best of our knowledge, there is no standardized
way to perform vulnerability scanning [4]. However, a
generalized approach followed by vulnerability scanners
is shown in Algorithm 1. First, a scanner performs host
discovery to identify the active targets. In a networked envi-
ronment, this can be performed using different techniques
such as a ping or SYN scan, among other techniques. Nmap
is a prominent tool for scanning that is also used by many
vulnerability scanners to perform host discovery [12]. The
active hosts’ ports will be scanned as well, in order to check
whether the port is open or closed. Second, if the port is
open, then this port scan will proceed to a service discovery
process to identify the running services. Afterwards, the
scanner will try different vulnerability payloads for the
identified service(s) in order to check whether they are
vulnerable or not. Figure 1 shows a general process for
vulnerability scanning. This is a lengthy process that can
take days or even weeks for scanning large networks [13].
Algorithm 1: Generalized traditional scanning pro-
cess
1 ScanTargets (T )
inputs : T : A set of targets to be scanned.
output:V: Vulnerabilities set (set per target
∀t ∈ T ).V  {1, 2, · · · , v , · · · ,V}
(v ⇒ t).
2 V ← ∅;
3 Tactive ← HostDiscover y(T );// Return active
targets. Error t.
4 foreach t ∈ Tactive do
5 Pactive ← PortScan(t);// Return active ports
for target t. Error p.
6 foreach p ∈ Pactive do
7 Sactive ← ServiceScan(p);// Return
active services for port p. Error s.
8 foreach s ∈ Sactive do
9 Vt+ 
Vulnerabilit yScan(s);// Return
service vulnerabilities of service
s. Error v.
10 V+ Vt
11 returnV;
3TABLE 1: Standards requirements related to vulnerability scanning
Document/Standard Description Requirements
PCI-DSS [6] Standard for credit card merchants and service
providers.
Requires periodical internal and external vulner-
ability scanning.
NIST 800-53 [5] Special publication for security and privacy con-
trols for federal information systems and organi-
zations.
Has numerous vulnerability scanning require-
ments such as RA-5, CA-8, SA-11, and RA-5(4).
NIST Cybersecurity Frame-
work (CSF) [7]
NIST framework for improving critical infras-
tructure cybersecurity. Contains best practices to
improve security.
Has vulnerability scanning control DE.CM-8.
CIS Critical Security Con-
trols [3]
List of 20 effective security controls for organiza-
tion to improve their overall security practices.
Vulnerability scanning is ranked as one of the
20 important security controls. In particular, con-
trols 4.1, 18.4, and 20.4 are concerned with vul-
nerability scanning.
ISO/IEC 27002:2013 [8] Information security management system stan-
dard. This document includes the best practices
for information security controls.
Vulnerability monitoring is discussed in control
number 12.6.1.
Cloud Security Alliance
(CSA) Cloud Controls
Matrix (CCM) [9]
Addresses security principles important for
cloud service providers.
Control TVM-02 address vulnerability scanning.
COBIT 4.1 & 5 [3] Is a good-practice framework developed by
ISACA for information technology (IT) manage-
ment and IT governance.
Build, Acquire, and Implement (BAI) domain
addresses vulnerability scanning requirements.
New York State Department
of Financial Services 23 NY-
CRR 500 [10]
Governmental standard to regulate the financial
services companies.
Requires vulnerability scanning twice a year (Sec-
tion 500.05).
Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) [11, 3]
Standards and regulations apply to health care
providers.
Section 164.308(a)(ii)(A) addresses risk analysis,
and Section 164.306 requires protection against
possible threats.
TABLE 2: Vulnerability scanning types
Type Description
Network-
based
Performs host discovery, ports enumeration, services enumeration and tries different payloads for vulnerabili-
ties.
Host-based More comprehensive than network-based scans because it covers local and remote vulnerabilities. The target
host should run the scan locally.
Wireless
based
A special scan type to cover wireless protocols and configurations.
Application
based
Scanning an application for application-specific vulnerabilities such as SQL injection. This is considered a risky
scan because it can alter the application [3].
Port 1
···
Ta
rg
et
H
os
t
Port 445
···
Port 65535
Network Scanner
(1) Check if the port is open
(2) If open: start service discovery scan
(3) Try different vulnerabilities for each discovered service
(4) Repeat for each port
Fig. 1: Sketch of the major steps in the traditional vulnerability scanning process
Vulnerability scanning is an integral part of organi-
zations in the 21st century because most of them rely
on IT for their daily operations. Although there are no
standardized methods to perform vulnerability scanning,
several standards regulate vulnerability scanning outcomes.
Vulnerability scanning compliance requirements are either
compulsory or non-compulsory. Compulsory compliance
drivers are usually governments or industry mandated
requirements [3]. For example, countries could require
organizations to adhere to specific rules, regulations, or
standards that require performing periodical vulnerability
scanning. Examples of those standards are: the Health Insur-
4ance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the New
York State Department of Financial Services, the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and the Payment Card
Industry - Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS). Examples
of standards that have vulnerability assessment as non-
compulsory requirements are: the ISO/IEC 27001:2013, the
Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) CSF, and the
NIST SP 800-53. Table 1 describes some standards in relation
to vulnerability scanning. There are four main vulnerability
scanning types: network, host, wireless, and application
based [3]. Table 2 describes each of those types. In this
paper, we focus on network and host-based scanning; other
types are out of the scope of this tool as this moment.
Although vulnerability scanning is crucial for numerous
standards and organizations, academic research is limited
in this area and it is dominated by the industry.
Wang and Yang [14] reviewed the major tools avail-
able for vulnerability scanning. In Table 3, we summarize
important details for each of them. Although there exist
numerous tools for vulnerability scanning, they all tend
to share similar scanning techniques. However, different
scanners produce different scanning results, so one could
indicate the system is vulnerable, while another indicates
that it is not. This is frustrating for users and indicates
the current scanners indecisiveness. For example, El et al.
[15] benchmarked numerous vulnerability scanners where
results showed conspicuous differences: some scanners dis-
covered two vulnerabilities while others discovered none.
Additionally, the authors highlighted the importance of
enhancing vulnerability scanning performance.
2.1 Internet-wide and large-scale scanning
Na et al. [16] proposed a technique for service identifica-
tion based on CPEs through analyzing the service banner
on open ports. We believe this work could reduce the
service scanning time by targeting specific services based
on CPEs’ enumeration. However, accuracy could be worse
than traditional scanning techniques because the authors’
claim is to provide security for "Internet-connected devices"
neglecting the fact that many Internet devices hide behind a
NAT, which renders port scanning and service enumeration
useless in most cases. Additionally, their work addresses
the service discovery phase only (from phases: (i) host
discovery, (ii) port discovery, (iii) service discovery, and (iv)
service vulnerability scan). This means that host and port
discovery phases are not enhanced. A year later, Na et al.
[17] analyzed their proposed mapping technique and found
that it suffers from limitations based on the CPE to vendor or
product name matching. We believe their work is still in its
rudimentary stages because one of their primary research
goals has not been addressed, which is mapping CPEs to
CVEs. The study only analyzes creating CPEs, while being
oblivious to the primary goal, i.e., CVEs matching. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first practical
solution to map CPEs to CVEs, based on our proposed
convention-based matching. Our solution is not theoretical
only but has been built in practice and compared to major
industrial scanners.
Some projects provide Internet-wide scanning, such as
Shodan [18] and Censys [19]. These projects perform
port scanning for active Internet IP addresses: if the device
responds to requests, then it will be scanned and its services
will be identified, based on the provided banner informa-
tion. Adversaries can use this information (which is pro-
vided publicly on the project’s website) to identify potential
vulnerabilities in hosts. Some researchers call this operation
contact-less active reconnaissance because the adversary does
not contact the target directly [20].
Genge and Enăchescu [21] proposed a vulnerability
assessment tool for Internet-connected devices, based on
Shodan API. The main idea from their work is identifying
CPEs based on the grabbed service version number. Na
et al. [17] highlighted a limitation in the work of Genge and
Enăchescu [21] which limits the match accuracy and cor-
rectness if the product name is located far from the version
number. O’Hare [20] proposed a new passive vulnerability
assessment tool called Scout that utilizes Censys and the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD)’s feeds. Scout also
tries to identify the host’s vulnerabilities passively.
2.1.1 Critique
We believe the aforementioned studies suffer from numer-
ous drawbacks. Firstly, almost all NAT devices are not cov-
ered by these studies and projects (unless a port forwarding
feature is enabled). Secondly, many firewalls drop scanning
packets; this will reduce the number of scanned hosts.
Thirdly, the scanning result is not conclusive, and, as it is
based on a trusted third party (i.e., Censys or Shodan), the
user cannot guarantee their accuracy or freshness. Fourthly,
this cannot be used for standards compliance; for example,
the PCI-DSS standard requires conducting vulnerabilities
assessment quarterly or after a major infrastructure up-
grade; assuming that all devices within the audit scope
expose their network interfaces to public IP addresses,
there is still a big challenge for data freshness provided
by Censys or Shodan, which might be conducted once a
year, due to the large number of IPv4 addresses (i.e., ~232 -
reserved addresses). Fifthly, assuming we are targeting IPv4,
scanning the Internet means covering 4,294,967,296 total
addresses - 588,514,304 reserved address = 3,706,452,992
devices, assuming each device requires 5 minutes (which
is less than actual time, based on some studies [22] and our
experimental results). Then, it would require the scanner
~35,748.96 years to complete the scans. Increasing the level
of parallelism will decrease the time required to accomplish
scanning. However, based on our experimental results, we
found that current scanners require ~150,000 packets to
scan a single host (for TCP scans only). Hence, increasing
the level of parallelism should be associated with a rapid
increase in network traffic. Even if we assume an unlimited
network bandwidth, each server has a limited resources, and
increasing servers would hugely increase costs. Lastly, and
most importantly, not all services provide banners. There are
no studies or statistics available in the literature regarding
the efficacy of such solutions, but we believe accurate scan-
ning for Internet devices is far from being realized using
current technologies. CVS makes it possible.
5TABLE 3: Summary of popular vulnerability assessment tools
Tool Name Strengths Weaknesses
Nessus • Simple and easy to use
• Compliant with numerous standards
• Licensing fees
• Closed-source
• Scanning takes a long time
OpenVAS • Compliant with numerous standards
• Open-source and free
• Scanning takes a long time
• Harder to use than alternatives
Nexpose • Simple and easy to use
• Compliant with numerous standards
• Licensing fees
• Closed-source
• Scanning takes a long time
Retina CS • Simple and easy to use
• Compliant with numerous standards
• Licensing fees
• Closed-source
• Scanning takes a long time
3 Threat Model
NIST’s definition for vulnerability scanning (in Definition 2)
is broad, and, based on our literature review, we believe
it is hard to satisfy its requirements. Hence, we redefine
vulnerability scanning as shown in Definition 3. Vulnera-
bility scanners provide a report of vulnerabilities usually
based on the CVE, the Common Vulnerability Scoring Sys-
tem (CVSS), CPE, and the Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE) standards. Simply put, the CVE is a list of publicly
known security vulnerabilities [23]. Each CVE contains an
identification number, a description, and references. CVSS is
an open industry standard to characterize and score vulner-
abilities [24]. CPE is a standardized method for identifying
applications, operating systems, and hardware [25]. CWE is
a community-developed list of software security weaknesses
[26].
Definition 3 (Vulnerability Scanning (proposed definition)).
Examining possible vulnerable components (PVCs) (see
Definition 4) in order to identify vulnerabilities affecting
them, based on CVE, CVSS, CPE, and CWE standards.
Definition 4 (Possible Vulnerable Component (PVC)). A
PVC is any software or hardware that could suffer from
a vulnerability. Each PVC has a required name property
and optional version, vendor, edition, update, and lan-
guage properties (as described in Table 4).
We consider a set of targets T  {1, 2, · · · , t , · · · , T},
where T  |T | (i.e., the cardinality of set T ). We
assume there exist an exhaustive set of PVCs, P 
{1, 2, · · · , p , · · · , P}, P ∈ Z>0. P contains all PVCs in NVDs
database and CPE’s dictionary (publicly available). Each
target (∀t ∈ T ) has a set of PVCs (P t ⊆ P, where |P t | ≥ 0).
We consider a vulnerability scanning software (VSS) that
has two main functionalities: (i) communicate securely with
vulnerability scanning clients (VSCs) and (ii) perform the
vulnerability scanning job for each VSC, where each t ∈ T
has a VSC. The difference between CVS and network scan-
ners is that the latter do not use VSCs. The VSC is a software
that has one primary function: request vulnerability scan
service from VSS while providing its set of PVCs (P t).
TABLE 4: PVC properties
Property Req./Opt. Description
Name Required Represents the PVC’s name. Examples:
Windows, Acrobat, WinRAR.
Version Optional Represents the PVC’s version number.
Does not have to follow any stan-
dardized naming convention. However,
many vendors follow a version number-
ing such as {major.minor.build.revision}
(e.g., 10.3.1.2344).
Vendor Optional Represents the PVC’s vendor. Examples:
Microsoft, Adobe, RARLabs.
Edition Optional Examples: Windows 10 Pro, Windows 7
Enterprise.
Update Optional Usually used for Windows operating
systems. Examples: Service Pack 3, as in
Windows XP Service Pack 3. Represents
the PVC’s update level for the applica-
tion, it also might indicate a patch level
for the PVC.
Language Optional Localization. Examples: EN-US.
We assume the vulnerability scanning client (VSC) (i.e.,
CVS-client) is trusted by targets and safe. This is a reason-
able assumption because the VSC is a tiny software with
a single functionality, and it is open source where targets
can verify that it is not collecting or reporting any personal
identifiable information (PII). For more details about PII
refer to [27]. We assume that the vulnerability scanning
server (VSS) is honest. However, the VSC can follow honest,
honest-but-curious, or malicious adversarial models. In this
context, "honest" refers to respecting and not deviating from
the protocol, either passively or actively. An honest-but-
curious adversary is a passive adversary that will follow
the protocol but will try to learn the activities of other
participants. A malicious adversary is an active adversary
that does not follow the protocol and tries to launch different
types of attacks, such as man-in-the-middle (MITM), denial-
of-service (DoS), and distributed DoS (DDoS), among other
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Fig. 2: NVD’s database statistics for vulnerability count (as
of Aug. 11, 2019)
attacks. We also assume a resourceful adversary called Eve
that can follow an honest-but-curious or malicious adversar-
ial models. Eve has full access of the intermediary network
between the VSCs and the VSS; she could be a system
administrator or even an Internet service provider (ISP); in
essence, she embodies the Dolev-Yao adversarial model [28].
We assume there exist an exhaustive set of vulner-
abilities, V  {1, 2, · · · , v , · · · ,V}, where V ∈ Z>0.
There exists an exhaustive set of CVSSs, CVSS 
{1, 2, · · · , cvss , · · · , CVSS}, where CVSS ∈ Z≥0. There
also exists an exhaustive set of CPEs, CPE 
{1, 2, · · · , cpe , · · · , CPE}, where CPE ∈ Z>0. Each vulner-
ability has an optional CVSS set (∀v ∈ V : ∃CVSSv ,
where |CVSSv | ∈ Z≥0 and CVSSv ⊆ CVSS). Each
vulnerability has an optional set of CPEs (∀v ∈ V ∃CPEv ,
where |CPEv | ∈ Z≥0 and CPEv ⊆ CPE). We modeled
CVSS and CPE sets as optional because our analysis showed
that NVD’s database contains CVEs without CVSS or CPE
entries as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 . Definition 5
shows our formal definition for vulnerability scanning,
where CVE t is the set of vulnerabilities that affect the target
t. Scan accuracy is shown in Equation (1).
Definition 5 (Vulnerability Scanning Formal Definition
(proposed definition)).
Given P t∗ ⊆ P t , ∀t ∈ T : find CVE t∗∗ ⊆ CVE t
Scan Accuracy  |CVE
t∗∗ ∩ CVE t |
|CVE t | ∗ 100% (1)
Figure 4 shows the PVC’s categories. Each PVC can be
either vulnerable or non-vulnerable. Each vulnerable PVC
can be either exploitable (if there is a known exploit for
it) or non-exploitable. A non-exploitable vulnerability does
not necessarily mean that it is secure because it might suffer
from zero-day vulnerabilities that are not published publicly
yet. Zero-day vulnerabilities are out of our scope.
In this context, our goals are the following:
• Goal 1: Provide a vulnerability scanning service (∀t ∈
T ), based on Definition 5.
• Goal 2: Maximize the vulnerability scanning accuracy
based on Equation (1).
• Goal 3: Minimize each target vulnerability scanning (i)
required time, and (ii) network traffic.
• Goal 4: Enable the VSS to learn from previous scanning
jobs (from the same target or different targets).
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
Year
C
ou
nt
Without CPEs
Without CVSS
Fig. 3: NVD’s database statistics for CVEs without CPE or
CVSS entries (as of Aug. 11, 2019)
• Goal 5: The VSS and VSC, as well as the commu-
nication between them, should be protected against
honest, honest-but-curious, and malicious adversaries
(including Eve).
4 Implementation Overview
Figure 6 shows CVS’s primary components. First, common
libraries contain communication APIs and helper functions
such as encryption/decryption, hashing, compression, log-
ging, services discovery modules, and serialization. Second,
the NVD contains XML schemas5 and the classes we created
to match those schemes; those classes are used as data
transfer objects (DTOs). Third, the CPE’s library contains
the CPE XML schema and corresponding DTO classes.
Fourth, the client application is a small software used by
targets to request scans. We used .NET Framework 4.0 for
the client application to make it support old versions of
Windows OS. Currently, CVS has Windows clients only. We
consider other operating systems for future work. Finally,
the server module is the main part of CVS and will be
discussed in detail herein. We used Entity Framework 6.0
as our object relationship mapper (ORM) and the Microsoft
SQL server as our database management system (DBMS).
We used C#, SQL, HTML, JavaScript (& jQuery), CSS, and
XML languages to build CVS server. At the time of writing,
the current CVS version is 2.0.0.0. Figure 5 shows a general
overview of the scanning process in CVS.
4.1 CVS Server Initialization and Update
CVS is very simple and easy to use. The server application
is only ~3 MB in size. We do not provide any pre-installed
vulnerability sets. However, CVS should be initialized at
first run, which is a common behavior among all surveyed
vulnerability scanners in the literature. Figure 7 shows the
server initialization process. The user starts the server by
double clicking on the application executable file. Then, to
initialize the server, the user should go to the configurations
tab and click on "update". This will automatically download
the CPEs dictionary, the NVD database, and the exploit-
db sources. Each of the aforementioned will be extracted,
parsed into CVS DTOs, filtered, and persisted into CVS
5. On Oct 16, 2019, NVD stopped providing XML feeds and moved
to JSON
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Fig. 4: Possible Vulnerable Components (PVCs) categories
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Fig. 5: Sketch of CVS scanning process
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Fig. 6: CVS main components
database using CVS schema. This process requires about 10
minutes (depending on Internet connection speed and work-
station specs). Table 5 shows the installation requirements
comparison between Nessus, Nexpose, and CVS. We believe
CVS has the simplest installation and update process among
surveyed scanners. Finally, the user can specify on which
port to start the scanning server listening for incoming
requests from VSCs i.e., CVS-clients.
TABLE 5: Installation requirements comparison
Scanner Requirements Size Install
Time
Initialize
Time
Nessus CPU: Quad-core, RAM: 4 GB 70MB 50 S 10m:09s
Nexpose CPU: Quad-core, RAM: 8 GB 736+MB 1m:30s 15m:45s
CVS
Server
CPU: Quad-core, RAM: 8GB 3MB 20S 9m:15s
4.2 CVS Server Scanning Process
Figure 8 shows CVS server scanning process. It consists of
five main phases: request handling, verification, queuing,
scanning core service, and CPEs generation.
• Phase 1 - Request Handling: This phase implements
the network interface and request/response operations.
CVS server receives requests in a non-blocking fashion.
Our initial tests show that the server can handle up
to 140 concurrent requests per second (as per machine
specs in Table 6). The request will be forwarded to the
verification phase, which acts as a software firewall.
• Phase 2 - Verification: This phase acts as a rule-based
software firewall. It checks the source IP/subnet, de-
vice ID, and encryption keys. It is fail-safe where the
connection will be dropped if it does not comply with
any of the rules.
• Phase 3 - Queuing: The server is built with the expecta-
tion to server a very large number of hosts concurrently.
Hence, it will not be prudent to keep the requests alive
until the scan job is finished. Thus, if the verification
phase decided to accept the scan task, it will be added
to a FIFO queue. The connection with the client will be
closed and the client will be provided with a token to
request the results later. The queue will serve a group
of jobs concurrently, based on the hardware resources,
each of which will be forwarded to the scanner phase.
This implementation makes the server act somehow as
a state-less server, which will help to protect against
flooding attacks.
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Fig. 7: CVS server initialization/update process (using BPMN notation)
TABLE 6: Scanning machines specifications
Item Description
For Nessus and CVS
CPU 6 cores Intel I7-8700K.
RAM 8 GB.
OS Windows 10 Professional.
Disk SSD.
Network 1Gbps Ethernet.
For Nexpose (because Windows 10 was not supported)
CPU 4 cores Intel I7-4700HQ.
RAM 12 GB.
OS Ubuntu 18.04.
Disk SSD.
Network 1Gbps Ethernet.
• Phase 4 - Scanner: The scanner receives jobs from the
queue to be scanned. For each PVC in the scan job, it
will launch a thread (with a concurrency cap). Each
thread will generate the possible CPEs for that PVC
(as in Phase 5). Afterwards, the possible CPEs will be
matched with CVS database. Then, the database will be
updated in order to reduce scanning time, in case the
same PVC showed up in future scans.
• Phase 5 - CPEs Generator: The primary function of this
phase is to map PVCs to possible CPEs. The VSS uses
CPEs to discover vulnerabilities targeting that PVC.
This phase is discussed in detail in Section 5.
5 CPEs Generation
CVS supports CPEs generation for operating systems, ap-
plications, and hardware PVCs. Section 5.1 addresses gen-
erating CPEs for operating systems. Section 5.2 discusses
generating CPEs for applications. Section 5.3 discusses gen-
erating CPEs for hardware. The aforementioned types share
the common properties of a PVC (shown in Table 4). Hence,
we made them utilize a common CPEs generation process,
as shown in Algorithm 2.
5.1 CPEs Generation for Operating Systems
Algorithm 3 shows the CPEs generation process for operat-
ing systems. The platform CPE component is always set to
’o’. Other components are generated automatically, based on
our proposed generation conventions. The CPE conventions
of the operating systems are shown in Tables 12, 10, 13, 7,
8, and 9 to generate vendors, products, versions, updates,
editions, and languages (respectively).
5.2 CPEs Generation for Applications
Algorithm 4 shows the CPEs generation process for appli-
cations. The platform CPE component is always set to ’a’.
Other components are generated automatically, based on
our proposed generation conventions. The application CPE
conventions are shown in Tables 14, 19, 15, 16, 17, and 18 to
generate vendors, products, versions, updates, editions, and
languages (respectively).
5.3 CPEs Generation for Hardware
For hardware PVCs, we use the same process and conven-
tions used for applications (discussed in Section 5.2). The
only change is that in Algorithm 4, we change the platform
from ’a’ to ’h’. All previously discussed components inherit
the base PVC’s properties (see Table 4). We believe that
the hardware PVCs will be the most challenging part for
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Fig. 8: CVS server scanning process (using BPMN notation)
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Algorithm 2: CPEs generation process for PVCs
1 PVCCPEsGeneration ( P,V, PR,VR, E,U , L)
inputs : P: Set of possible platforms.
|P| ∈ Z≥1,≤3 , ∀p ∈ P : p < [null , empty].
inputs :V: Set of possible vendor names.
|V| ∈ Z≥1 , ∀v ∈ V : v < [null , empty].
inputs : PR: Set of possible product names.
|PR| ∈ Z≥1 , ∀pr ∈ PR : pr < [null , empty].
inputs :VR: Set of possible versions. |VR| ∈
Z≥1 , ∀vr ∈ VR : vr < [null , empty].
inputs : E: Set of possible editions. |E | ∈ Z≥0.
inputs :U : Set of possible updates. |U | ∈ Z≥0.
inputs : L: Set of possible languages. |L| ∈ Z≥0.
output: C: Set of possible CPEs.
2 C ← ∅;
3 foreach (p ∈ P) do
4 foreach (v ∈ V) do
5 foreach (pr ∈ PR) do
6 foreach (vr ∈ VR) do
7 if (U  ∅) then
8 C.Add("cpe : /p : v : pr : vr");
9 if (E  ∅) then
10 C.Add("cpe : /p : v : pr : vr :
u");
11 if (L  ∅) then
12 C.Add("cpe : /p : v : pr :
vr : u : e");
C.Add("cpe : /p : v :
pr : vr : u : e :");
13 else
14 foreach (l ∈ L) do
15 C.Add("cpe : /p : v :
pr : vr : u : e : l");
16 else
17 foreach (e ∈ E) do
18 foreach (l ∈ L) do
19 C.Add("cpe : /p : v :
pr : vr : u : e : l");
20 else
21 foreach (u ∈ U) do
22 foreach (e ∈ E) do
23 foreach (l ∈ L) do
24 C.Add("cpe : /p : v :
pr : vr : u : e : l");
25 return C;
CVS deployment, because, according to our analysis, there
are ~5,000 distinct vendors. It would be an intricate task to
provide one client to support all hardware products because
they use different libraries. On the other hand, this issue
is easily resolved for operating systems and applications
because they rely on a few vendors that build their software,
according to general architectures (e.g., one client is enough
for all Windows platforms and all applications running
in Windows). One way to resolve this issue for hardware
is to provide an API (e.g., RESTFUL), wherein hardware
products use the API to request scans.
Algorithm 3: CPEs generation process for OSs
1 OSCPEsGeneration (O)
inputs : PVC: PVC properties .
inputs : O: OS properties. Inherits PVC
properties (in Table 4).
output: C: list of possible CPEs.
2 C ← ∅;
/* For OS platform always assumed to be ’o’ */
3 P ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(’o’) ;
/* OS possible vendors generated according to
conventions in Table 12. */
4 V ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 12) ;
/* OS possible product generated according to
conventions in Table 10. */
5 PR ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 10) ;
/* OS possible versions generated according to
conventions in Table 13. */
6 VR ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 13) ;
/* OS possible updates generated according to
conventions in Table 7. */
7 U ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 7) ;
/* OS possible editions generated according to
conventions in Table 8. */
8 E ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 8) ;
/* OS possible languages generated according to
conventions in Table 9. */
9 L ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 9) ;
/* CPEs are generated based on generalized
algorithm in Algorithm 2. */
10 C ← PVCCPEsGeneration(P,V, PR,VR, E,U ,
L);
11 return C;
TABLE 7: OS update generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
1 Empty As the update is an
optional field
We assume the up-
date is empty because
it is optional.
2 Abbreviations Abbreviations of ser-
vice pack property
If the provided ser-
vice pack is ’service
pack 3’ then the pos-
sible edition is ’sp3’.
6 Results and Discussion
6.1 Methodology
We compared CVS with two commercial vulnerability scan-
ners: Nessus and Nexpose. We used the free trial provided
by the vendors. Both scanners were configured for exhaus-
tive scanning policy for TCP ports only. We excluded UDP
TABLE 8: OS edition generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
1 Empty As the edition is an op-
tional field
We assume the edition
is empty.
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TABLE 9: OS language generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
1 Empty As the language is an
optional field
We assume the lan-
guage is empty.
TABLE 10: OS product name generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
1 Combinations Generate combinations of
the provided OS name
value sub-strings based
on empty spaces com-
bined with separators in
Table 11.
If the provided OS
name was ’windows
xp’, then possible
combinations will be
[’windowsxp’, ’windows-
xp’, ’windows_xp’].
ports from scanning because this largely increases the scan
TABLE 11: Possible separator chars used for combinations
Separator char Description
"_" Underscore char
"-" Dash char
"" none
Algorithm 4: CPEs generation process for applica-
tions
1 AppCPEsGeneration (A)
inputs : PVC: PVC properties .
inputs : A: App properties. Inherits PVC
properties (in Table 4).
output: C: list of possible CPEs.
2 C ← ∅; /* App’s OS platform always assumed to be
’a’ */
3 P ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(’a’) ;
/* App’s possible vendors generated according to
conventions in Table 14. */
4 V ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 14) ;
/* App’s possible product generated according to
conventions in Table 19. */
5 PR ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 19) ;
/* App’s possible versions generated according to
conventions in Table 15. */
6 VR ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 15) ;
/* App’s possible updates generated according to
conventions in Table 16. */
7 U ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 16) ;
/* App’s possible editions generated according to
conventions in Table 17. */
8 E ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 17) ;
/* App’s possible languages generated according
to conventions in Table 18. */
9 L ← GenerateBasedOnConventions(Table 18) ;
/* CPEs are generated based on generalized
algorithm in Algorithm 2. */
10 C ← PVCCPEsGeneration(P,V, PR,VR, E,U ,
L);
11 return C;
time (more than an hour per host). Table 6 shows the host
machines specifications. We used two machines: Windows
10 and Linux, because Nexpose did not work on the former.
Table 20 shows the tested machines’ specifications.
6.1.1 Accuracy Analysis
Recently, benchmarks have been introduced for web applica-
tions vulnerability scanners [29, 30, 31]. However, there are
no benchmarks for network vulnerability scanning. Hence,
to test the selected machines (in Table 20), we used a third-
party statistics provider to get the actual number of vulner-
abilities in each operating system. We reduced the results
comparison problem for operating system vulnerabilities
only, neglecting any installed applications, to make it easier
to compare. Even without reducing the discovered number
of vulnerabilities by Nessus and Nexpose, they were very
few, ranging from 4 to 6 vulnerabilities. However, the actual
vulnerabilities based on [32] were 180, 199, and 391 for
Windows server 20086, Windows 77, and Windows XP 8 (re-
spectively). Additionally, we assumed that all vulnerabilities
reported by Nessus and Nexpose were correct, to show the
upper limit for their accuracy. We calculated their accuracy
by dividing the number of their discovered vulnerabilities
by the actual vulnerabilities. For CVS, however, we first
matched each of the discovered vulnerabilities with the
actual vulnerabilities set, then accuracy was calculated by
dividing the matches over the actual number of vulnerabili-
ties, as in Equation (1), to show the actual accuracy of CVS.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Performance Results
Table 21 shows our performance analysis results and com-
parison between Nessus, Nexpose, and CVS. We focused on
two performance measurements: scanning time and com-
municated network traffic. CVS had the lowest scanning
time and communicated network traffic for all experiments.
Compared to Nessus, CVS reduced scanning time and net-
work traffic by an average of 93.59% and 99.97% (respec-
tively). Compared to Nexpose, CVS reduced scanning time
and network traffic by an average of 64.92% and 99.97%
(respectively).
Additionally, we scanned each host two times using the
same scanner to check whether the scanner learns from pre-
vious scans or not. There was no improvement for Nessus
and Nexpose. However, CVS improved scanning time, with
an average of ~97% when the same host was scanned for the
second time, because CVS learns from previous experiences
and the scanning engine can identify previous PVCs that
are impossible to change unless the database is updated.
For each database update, however, PVCs scanning results
records will be adapted to the new updated vulnerabilities.
6. https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-
26/product_id-11366/version_id-82464/Microsoft-Windows-Server-
2008--.html
7. https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-26/
product_id-17153/version_id-138704/Microsoft-Windows-7--.html
8. https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-
26/product_id-739/version_id-46866/Microsoft-Windows-Xp-.html
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TABLE 12: OS vendor name generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
1 WinOS.A For Windows OS, the vendor always set to ’microsoft’. Windows XP, Windows 10.
2 Android.A Match vendor with selected android possible vendors from CVS DB. Currently Android has 3
vendors (Google, Motorolla, and CodeAurora). If could not discover correct vendor, then use all
vendors from possible vendors in CVS DB.
cpe:/o:motorola:android:4.1.2,
cpe:/o:google:android:8.0,
cpe:/o:codeaurora:android-
msm:3.2.57
3 Apple.A Currently Apple has the following OSs [a_ux, airport_base_station_firmware, apple_tv,
iphone_os, mac_os, mac_os_appleshare_ip, mac_os_server, mac_os_x, mac_os_x_server,
os_x_server, watch_os, watchos]. Hence, match PVC properties to one of them. (The list is
updated automatically when new OSs are added.)
cpe:/o:apple:iphone_os:10.1.1.
4 Linux.A Currently Linux has 22 possible vendors [canonical, conectiva, corel, debian, engardelinux,
gentoo, ibm, linux, linuxmint, mandrakesoft, mandriva, novell, opensuse, opensuse_project,
oracle, redhat, scientificlinux, sgi, slackware, suse, trustix, windriver]. Each vendor has a set
of operating system names associated with it. Hence, first try to match PVC properties to one of
the vendors directly. Second, if it did not match, then try to match PVC properties to OS name,
then reflect on its vendor (updated automatically from CVS DB).
Ubuntu Linux will be matched
to vendor name canonical.
5 Other.A Find a list of possible vendors from CVS DB, then try to match PVC properties with one or more
of them.
-
6 Other.B Find a list of possible vendors from DB, and for each vendor, find the list of possible OS names.
Then, try to match PVC properties to the OS name; if matched, then reflect this on the matched
OS name vendor.
-
TABLE 13: OS version generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
1 M.M.B. The version is major.minor.build Create version as "Major. Minor. Build" 10.1.2991.
2 Revision The version is equal to revision Assume that the OS version is equal to the OS revision.
3 M.M.B.R. major.minor.build.revision Format as "Major.Minor.Build.Revision" 10.1.2991.5000.
4 M.M. major.minor only Format as "Major.Minor" 10.1.
5 Build Build only Use OS info properties to generate version in the format of "Build".
6 dash Use - Assume the version is ’-’; this is sometimes used to indicate a vulnerability in
all versions of the OS.
7 Combinations OS name combinations Similar to convention 1 from Table 10. Some OSs use the name combination
for the version.
TABLE 14: App vendor generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
1 App publisher property If the publisher property is not empty, we assume
the publisher is the vendor.
As ’Adobe’ for ’Adobe Reader’.
2 First word If the application name contains two or more
words, then the vendor is the first word.
If app name is ’Adobe Reader’, we assume vendor
is ’Adobe’.
3 First and second word If the application name contains three or more
words, then the vendor is the first and second
words combined with separators Table 11.
"Acme solutions paint" then we assume the
vendors are ["Acmesolutions", "Acme_solutions",
"Acme-solutions].
TABLE 15: App version generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
1 Display version property If the display version property is not empty we
assume it is the version.
See https://goo.gl/PJoWKM for products on
Windows platform.
2 Version in title Check the app display name if it contains version
strings using Regex.
’CPUID 1.82.2’, then version is 1.82.2.
TABLE 16: App update generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
1 Empty As the update is an optional field We assume the update is empty.
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TABLE 17: App edition generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
1 Empty As the edition is an optional field We assume the edition is empty.
TABLE 18: App language generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
1 Empty As the language is an optional field We assume the language is empty.
TABLE 19: App product name generation conventions
# Convention Description Example
Phase 1: If product exists in exhaustive products list in CVS DB, skip to Phase2
P1.1 Combinations Generate combinations of the provided OS name
value sub-strings based on empty spaces com-
bined with separators in Table 11, removing
strings that match version format of major.minor.*
.
If the provided app name was "visual studio 14.1",
then possible combinations will be ["visualstudio",
"visual-studio", "visual_studio"].
P1.2 Abbreviations Abbreviations of product name, removing strings
that match version format of major.minor.* .
If the provided app name was "media player
classic 12.5", then possible combinations will be
["mpc"].
Phase2: Only applied if Phase 1 failed to get match.
P2.1 First word If the product name has only one word, we assume
it is the product name.
P2.2.A Name has two
words
If the product name has two non-version words,
then the name is the first word.
App name "java 7 update 1", possible products are
["java"].
P2.2.B Name has two
words
If the product name has two non-version words,
then the name is their combinations with separa-
tors in Table 11
App name "github desktop", possible products
are ["githubdesktop", "github_desktop", "github-
desktop"].
P2.3.A Name has three
words
If the product name has three non-version words,
then the name is the second word.
App name "jetbrains resharper ultimate", possible
products are ["resharper"].
P2.3.B Name has three
words
First and third word, or second and third word
combined with separators in Table 11.
"vlc media player", possible products ["vlcmedi-
aplayer", "vlc_media_player", "vlc-media-player"].
P2.4.B Name has more
than three words
All words combined with separators in Table 11.
TABLE 20: Tested machines specifications
Machine Description
Windows XP SP3
build 5.1.2600
Latest release April 21 2008. Old laptop we had
for home use. It has 158 installed applications.
Although Windows XP is not supported anymore
by Microsoft, we tested it because most ATM
machines still use it [33].
Windows Server
2008 R2
Service Pack 1 version 6.1.7601.65536. Widely used
for servers. This was running on a VM as freshly
installed OS with 7 reinstalled apps.
Windows 7 Service Pack 1 version 6.1.7601.65536. Widely used
for users. This was running on a VM as freshly
installed OS with 7 reinstalled apps.
6.2.2 Accuracy Results
We performed accuracy analysis according to the previously
discussed methodology in Section 6.1.1. Table 22 shows
our accuracy analysis for operating system vulnerabilities.
The high increase of discovered vulnerabilities by CVS is
expected because it scans the whole machine’s PVCs, unlike
the other scanners that scan network interface PVCs only.
Average accuracy for Nessus, Nexpose, and CVS was 2.16%,
2.23%, and 57.83% (respectively). Compared to Nessus, CVS
increased accuracy by an average of 2620%. Compared to
Nexpose, CVS increased accuracy by an average of 2720%.
Many applications do not expose their services to network
interfaces but are still vulnerable. This gives a false sense
of security to users. Using traditional scanners gives such
impression while CVS does not.
7 Security Analysis
In Section 3, we discussed our threat model and security
goals. Communication between CVS-server and CVS-client
uses the latest Transport Layer Security (TLS) specs. CVS
can also use symmetric keys instead of TLS, but the default
implementation uses TLS. Network communication is en-
crypted using the Advance Encryption Standard - Galois
Counter Mode AES-GCM [34]. AES-GCM works as an
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TABLE 21: Performance comparison between CVS, Nessus, and Nexpose (Insight VM)
Vulnerability Scanner Name CVS Improvements
Nessus 7.1.3 (#120) Nexpose 6.5.3.0 CVS 1.1.0. 4 Over Nessus 4 Over Nexpose
Device Try Time Pckts Time Pckts Time Pckts Time% Pckts% Time% Pckts%
Windows XP SP3 2600 1
st 1152 156175 276 144252 193 54 ↓83.25 ↓99.97 ↓30.07 ↓99.96
2st 1224 166837 288 148584 3 50 ↓99.75 ↓99.97 ↓98.96 ↓99.97
Windows 7 SP1 1
st 962 136048 156 145452 107 44 ↓88.88 ↓99.97 ↓31.41 ↓99.97
2st 852 136008 164 146278 3 36 ↓99.65 ↓99.97 ↓98.17 ↓99.98
Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 1
st 1153 149750 166 141386 111 40 ↓90.37 ↓99.97 ↓33.13 ↓99.97
2st 1113 149950 181 146242 4 36 ↓99.64 ↓99.98 ↓97.79 ↓99.98
4: ↓93.59% ↓99.97% ↓64.92% ↓99.97%
Time is in Seconds. Pckts: network traffic packets.
TABLE 22: Accuracy comparison between CVS, Nessus, and Nexpose (Insight VM)
Discovered Vulnerabilities by Accuracy (%) CVS Improvement
Device Nessus Nexpose CVS Actual* Nessus Nexpose CVS Nessus(%) Nexpose(%) Comment
Windows XP SP3 2600 9 6 261 391 ≤2.3 ≤1.5 60 ↑2500 ↑3900 CVS had 231/261 matches
Windows Server 2008
R2 SP1
4 5 95 180 ≤2.2 ≤2.7 26.6 ↑1109 ↑885 CVS had 48/180 matches
Windows 7 SP1 4 5 173 199 ≤2 ≤2.5 86.9 ↑4245 ↑3376 CVS had 173/199 matches
Accuracy: 2.16 2.23 57.83 ↑2620 ↑2720
*Based on [32]
authenticated mode of operation that has internal integrity
checks. AES-GCM is widely used and recommended by
IETF RFCs for IPsec, SSH, and TLS, and it is provably secure
[35, 36]. Table 23 shows our encryption setup parameters.
In CVS, we assume the VSS host is secure against internal
threats, and system administrators are considered honest.
Addressing semi-honest or malicious VSS will be considered
in future work. Communication between VSC and VSS
encompasses two main phases: scan job request, and scan
result request. Figure 9 shows communication messages
between VSC and VSS.
First, the VSC requests a scan job from the VSS by send-
ing two versions of its identifier: VSCaID and VSC
b
ID . VSC
a
ID
is sent to allow the server to identify the shared key directly.
(In implementation it will be encrypted with a session key
derived from the VSS public keys (e.g., RSA)). The primary
need for the shared key is authentication (e.g., it can be a
user hashed and salted password). VSCbID is used to verify
that adversaries did not change VSCaID during transit. The
VSC also includes a sequence number (SN) and a time
stamp (TS) to ensure message freshness and protection from
replay attacks. Additionally, the VSC includes the required
scanning details (RSD) that do not contain PII; it is used
by the VSS to perform scanning. Once the VSS receives the
scanning request, it will follow the scanning process shown
in Figure 8. If the VSS firewall accepts the job, then the VSS
will send back a token to the VSC. Otherwise, the VSC will
be provided with the reject reason. The VSC can discover
MITM attacks (assuming Eve changed VSCaID in message
(1)) by checking the value of VSCaID in message (2); if it
is different from the value in message (1), then it has been
changed during transit.
Second, assuming the first phase succeeded and the VSC
received the token, it will then request the scan result every
specific period (e.g., 5 minutes). The VSS checks the token
and validates the request. If valid, then the VSS will send
back the scan results. If the VSS did not finish scanning
that request, the VSS will send back a message indicating
it is not ready yet. The VSS also allows a limited number
of scan result requests to avoid denial-of-service attacks. We
provide security analysis for the two main parties of CVS:
the VSC (Section 7.1) and the VSS (Section 7.2).
7.1 VSC Security Analysis
Communication confidentiality between a VSC and a VSS
is protected from Eve by using TLS. A VSC is protected
from a replay attack from Eve by having a sequence number
in the encrypted payload that depends on the previous
message sent by the VSC. Message freshness is protected
using a timestamp to prevent Eve from exploiting previously
recorded messages. We assume both the VSC and VSS are
time synchronized (including different time zones) with a
specific allowance window δt (e.g., 1 minute). Communica-
tion integrity between a VSC and a VSS is protected through
Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) used in the
Advance Encryption Standard - Galois Counter Mode (AES-
GCM). A VSC can discover a Main-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attacks by comparing the VSCaID from message (1) and mes-
sage (2). (The server will always detect it as impersonation
attack and reject it.)
7.2 VSS Security Analysis
Communication confidentiality between a VSS and a VSC
is protected from adversaries using TLS. Each VSC shares a
unique symmetric key with the VSS for authentication. The
VSS is protected from impersonation attacks by checking
the VSC identifier VSCaID and VSC
b
ID . If they are not equal,
then an adversary is launching an impersonation attack. The
VSS is protected from replay attacks through checking the
message freshness, using the time stamp and the sequence
number. If a device is sending many valid requests, it will be
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TABLE 23: Parameters used for AES-GCM and GMAC
Parameter Key Length Remarks
Encryption Key Size 128 bits Sufficient until the year 2076. [35, 37, 38].
GMAC Output Size 128 bits Sufficient [35].
Nonce/IV Size 128 bits As per GCM algorithm (see [34]).
Salt Size 128 bits Mixed with the password. Increase protection against dictionary attacks.
Iterations 100 Number of iterations for the mixing function.
VSS (server) VSC (client)
(1)
[
VSCaID ‖ EKVSC
(
VSCbID ‖ SN ‖ TS ‖ RSD
)]
Verify and Queue Request
(2)
[
EKVSC
(
VSCaID ‖ SN + 1 ‖ TS2∗ ‖ JobId ‖ {Accpet |Re ject} ‖ Msg
)]
Phase 1: Request Scan Job
(3)
[
VSCaID ‖ EKVSC
(
VSCbID ‖ SN2 ‖ TS ‖ JobId
)]
(4)
[
EKVSC
(
VSCaID ‖ SN2 + 1 ‖ TS2∗ ‖ JobId ‖ {Ready |NotReady} ‖ ScanResult
)]
Phase 2: Request Result
Fig. 9: Communication diagram between a VSC and a VSS in CVS. SN: Sequence number. TS: Timestamp. RSD: Required
scanning details.
blocked for an exponentially increasing period. Communi-
cation integrity is protected using the GMAC in AES-GCM.
8 Conclusions
Traditional vulnerability scanning methods are time-
consuming and indecisive, and negatively affect network
performance by generating high network traffic. In this
paper, we presented a novel vulnerability scanner called
Calcium Vulnerability Scanner (CVS) that is time-efficient,
simple, accurate, and safe. Our contributions to vulnerability
scanning are the following: (i) minimize its required time
and network traffic (compared to current technologies, we
reduced the former by an average of 79% and the latter
by 99.9%), (ii) increase its accuracy (compared to current
technologies, we improved it by an average of 2600%), and
(iii) enable the scanner to learn from previous scans in
order to reduce future scanning time and enhance accuracy
(compared to current technologies (that did not support
learning), CVS reduced scanning time by an average of
97% through learning). CVS should enhance and facilitate
vulnerability scanning and enable the implementing of
scanning on a large scale efficiently. We envision that this
remodeling will lead to faster, more scalable, and easier
deployment of scanners for large scale big data servers,
and cloud computing. Security standards can be revisited
again to adjust the scanning frequency requirements which
can be increased using our proposed approach to provide
a better security measures. CERTs will be able to conduct
more frequent scanning on larger scales and hence yield a
better response time.
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